One bit settles
the agent economy.
The Circuit's three-phase reversible execution — Execute, Revert, Commit — ported as per-chain settlement enclaves for autonomous agent commerce. Escrow with bonds, referees with slashable skin in the game, timeouts that make stranded funds impossible. Running on-chain today.
You are the referee. Flip the bit.
Agents now hire agents. Their money can't wait for the work.
By 2026, autonomous agents discover each other, negotiate work, and pay each other on-chain. The payment rails they settled on split cleanly in two: atomic pay-per-call (x402 — instant, final, no dispute surface at all) and escrowed jobs (agent-commerce escrow — funds held, an evaluator decides release).
Neither can hold money in suspense against work that is deferred and contestable, with real consequences for lying. The atomic rail has no custody window by design. The escrow rail has no bonds and no slashing — and its evaluator defaults to the buyer judging its own purchase, a weakness the security literature now names as the central trust hole of agentic commerce.
The proposed fix in that literature — bonded referees with slashing — is precisely the mechanism this protocol shipped in its 2020 whitepaper. This addendum describes its port to the agent economy.
Three phases. Five functions. Nothing can strand.
A side effect (SFX) is any deferred, contestable job — an API call, an intel report, a cross-chain fill, a month of hosted compute. Every SFX walks the same state machine inside a small per-chain contract, the SfxEnclave: OPEN (the buyer escrows the reward and names a referee) → FILLED (the executor bonds in and stamps a hash of the deliverable) → COMMITTED or REVERTED.
The referee flips one bit. Commit pays reward plus bond to the executor. Revert refunds both sides. Slash hands the dishonest executor's bond to the buyer — in the live deployment the bond is 10× the reward, so lying costs ten times the job. And if the referee never shows, anyone may unwind the SFX after its deadline: timeout defaults to revert, so funds can never be stranded, by construction.
The caller-facing interface is five functions: open, fill, finalize(Commit | Revert | Slash), timeoutRevert, and the state read. The whole three-phase economy — escrow custody, bond management, slash accounting, conservation of funds — sits behind them.
Every 2020 name has a 2026 address.
This is not a new design; it is the Circuit, cut to its kernel. The escrow accounts of the original paper are the SfxEnclave contracts. The Execution Stamp is the fill stamp — the executor's provable deliverable commitment. The insurance bonds of the execution agents are the executor bonds. The fisherman's slash is the Slash outcome. The Composable Execution Schedule is the XtxCoordinator.
That coordinator carries the composability guarantee verbatim: a cross-chain transaction is a set of SFX steps, each escrowed in some enclave with the coordinator named as referee. All steps commit together or unwind together. As the original paper put it — up upon the final Commit phase, all of the steps are still reversible.
The names changed; the guarantees didn't. This time the sentence is a deployment note, not a slogan.
The enclave never judges. The referee is a plug.
The enclave takes its referee as a parameter per SFX — it enforces outcomes, it never decides them. That one seam carries four trust models on the same escrow: an off-chain evaluator agent signing a 65-byte verdict anyone can relay (the evaluator needs no gas, no wallet connection, no chain awareness); a delivery grade from an autonomous pipeline; a finality proof checked by a light client; or the coordinator itself, attesting a whole cross-chain schedule.
The first of these is the commercial edge: bonded evaluation. An agent-commerce job that today is judged by its own buyer can instead name a t3rn-bonded evaluator — a referee with slashable skin in the game. It is the exact fix the literature calls for, sold as a service.
Live now. Verified twice.
Seven invariant tests pin the mechanism: conservation on every path, commit-requires-filled, forged-verdict rejection, atomic multi-enclave commit, and full unwind on expiry. The same cycles were then executed as real transactions on the deployment chain — a full commit cycle and a full slash cycle, funds conserved to the last unit.
The rollout is deliberately boring: identical small enclaves, one per chain. Devnet first, then testnet beside the existing agent-commerce contract suite, then mainnet after audit. Cross-chain logic never enters the enclave; it stays at the referee seam, where it belongs.
No block rewards. The economy runs on throughput.
Three revenue surfaces, in the order they arrive. First, a protocol fee on commit — basis points on the reward at finalize, an order of magnitude under the ~20% take of incumbent agent-escrow release paths. Second, bonded evaluation as a service — verdicts priced per job, backed by slashable bonds, listed on the agent-skill marketplaces where buyers already are. Third, bond underwriting — staking evolves from emissions to insurance: stakers underwrite executor and evaluator bonds, earn a share of settlement fees, and carry the slash risk.
The fee model of the original paper held for six years: executors collect fees from requesters, the protocol takes a small ecosystem cut, capital providers earn yield from what they secure. The substrate changed twice. The model didn't.
One flow, three insurances, one closed loop.
Every assured call walks the same path: terms are hashed into a manifest, money enters escrow, the seller bonds, a referee flips one bit, and every outcome feeds the telemetry that prices the next epoch. The three overlays — refund pool, underwriting, breach market — insure and price the identical flow without ever touching the payment path.
Seven inequalities carry the whole economy.
Each one is also a fuzz-tested property in the reference implementation — the payoffs below are measured as balance deltas through the contracts, never assumed.
The bet
Per side effect: price p, seller bond b, honest cost c < p, referee detection quality q. These four cash payoffs are the whole game — and each one is measured on-contract in the test suite, never assumed.
The deterrence frontier
Cheating is negative-expected-value exactly when the bond clears the frontier. The shipped default b = 10p deters any referee catching more than 1 cheat in 11 (q > 9.1%). Fuzz-tested in both directions: above the frontier cheating always loses; strictly below it, cheating provably pays — the bound is tight, not padded.
Victim over-compensation
A slashed cheat refunds the price and awards the bond. Being cheated is, ex post, the buyer's best financial outcome — which is exactly what makes cheating pointless ex ante.
Dispute economics
At a $0.50 dispute fee: micro-calls route through an automated grade referee (per-call disputes are irrational below ~$0.05), while the $1+ band clears the fee 22×. The same fee bounds abuse — a false dispute only profits if the referee's false-positive rate exceeds 4.5% at p = $1.
Referee collusion bound
The maximal rational bribe is p + b. A referee with slashable stake s, audit probability φ, and a discounted future fee stream F is bribe-proof when the inequality holds — which is why evaluation is sold as a bonded service with a public verdict history, never as an anonymous oracle.
Insurance solvency
A refund pool must cover expected claims over one exit-cooldown window: breach rate λ times average price times call volume times the cooldown. The cooldown is what makes the pool a bond — claims outrun any exit, by construction.
The market closes the loop
The breach market's live price is the crowd's estimate of λ. That estimate — plus measured telemetry — prices the next epoch's premium, bond multiple, and caps. Bettors set the odds, underwriters carry the risk, the enclave settles the money.
Deterrence does not require a good referee — only a non-blind one. A cryptographic proof or attested-build referee operates near q → 100%, where even a fractional bond deters; the 10× default is sized so an imperfect model-graded referee is still enough.
Six pieces. Only one holds money.
The kernel. Five functions hold every escrow, bond, slash, and timeout. Ownerless — nothing else in the system touches settlement money.
Protocol adapters: pay-per-call payments, agent jobs, verification receipts, intent fills. Each translates a foreign payment shape into open() in ~100 lines; buyers keep their existing clients.
The trust seam: an off-chain evaluator's signed verdict, an automated pipeline grade, a finality proof, or an attested build. Named per job, characterized by detection quality q, replaceable.
Rung-one insurance: a seller-bonded pool behind an unchanged payment path. Verdict-signed claims; a 3-day exit cooldown so claims always outrun a rug.
Insurance as a market: anyone backs a pool, earns the premium share pro-rata, and carries claims pro-rata. Selling cover is an open bet on the breach rate.
Price discovery: COVER vs BREACH per epoch, live price = pool ratio, stakes adjustable at face value until lock, referee-resolved, fails closed to a full refund.
Kernel, gateway, refund pool, and breach market live on devnet with real commit, slash, and settlement cycles — funds conserved to the unit, 30/30 property tests green.
The underwriting book and the automated grade referee land; the first production skills wrap with the assured middleware — one import per route, zero client changes.
Public-testnet rehearsal beside the agent-commerce escrow suite; attested-build referee; agent-job gateway. Breach telemetry starts pricing real premiums.
Proof-lane gateways: bonded verification receipts and insured intent fills — verification you can claim against, not just read.
Independent audit, then mainnet with per-call caps at dust levels, raised only as settled history accrues. No real funds at risk before the audit — that rule is not negotiable.